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Introduction 
 
Ever since the split between values and existence occurred in philosophical thought the 
question of values and their nature has been of major importance in philosophy, particularly 
in the discipline of ethics. The split increased even more so in the late 18th and more 
prominently in the 19th century. One of the most prominent and strongest challenges came 
from Friedrich Nietzsche who famously declared, after God’s death, the need for the 
revaluation of all values as the goal of his philosophy.ii In the 20th century the problem of 
values was taken up anew by particular strands of Continental philosophy, mainly by 
phenomenological approaches, but also by thinkers who developed meta-ethical concepts. 
The final death blow for Continental value theory is considered to have come from the rising 
star of phenomenology, Martin Heidegger, who, in the wake of Nietzsche’s value critique, 
accused the objective value theories of “pseudo-objectivism” – a critique that is still 
widespread today. This seems to have left behind a gap in ethics which neither normative nor 
meta-ethical approaches in Contemporary philosophy have found a way to overcome – how 
can one operate with values in morality and at the same time presuppose their limited 
validity?  
An additional but related problem was posed by the American philosopher Thomas 
Nagel: How can the perspectives of a particular person within the world be combined with an 
objective view of the same world?iii The importance of reconciling these positions is 
particularly urgent for ethics. We can of course ask why we should not just be content with 
adopting relativism as the logically necessary ethical stance. But the problem with relativism 
or any kind of scepticism (from whence moral relativism stems) is that, when taken to an 
extreme point, it defeats its own purpose. With his attestation that he has discovered the truth 
that there are no truths Nietzsche manoeuvres himself into a clearly aporetic position. iv
The question of the nature of values, their realness and the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge of values did not disappear from the subsequent philosophical debates. Just as 
Nietzsche had focused on the question of moral values so too did the debates of the early 20
  
th 
century philosophy since ethical questions seemed extremely difficult to answer without 
touching upon value judgements.v On the analytic side Scheler’s contemporary George 
Edward Moore published in 1903 his influential book Principia Ethica, in which he, just like 
his Continental colleagues, discussed the questions of intrinsic values and their knowability. 
Scheler knew of Moore’s approach though it is difficult to know how familiar Scheler was 
with Moore’s work. But Scheler refers to Moore in an approving way in the preface of his 
principle work Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (1926). Here 
Scheler claims that Moore in many ways has approached the subject of values in a similar 
way.vi To the present day Moore has remained one of the most influential thinkers in the 
analytic tradition in the area of ethics and value discussions. His arguments against many 
ethical approaches on the basis of the open question argument (ethical questions must be 
open questions, i.e. the answer must not be implied in the premises) and the naturalistic 
fallacy still remain the main arguments against many classical approaches in ethics.vii 
Furthermore, Moore argues for the inseparability of knowledge (which is relevant for the 
value question) and ethics: “The direct object of Ethics is knowledge and not practice; and 
any one who uses the naturalistic fallacy has certainly not fulfilled this first object, however 
correct his practical principles may be.”viii
But if we talk about the relevance of the question (if values are real) for 
Contemporary ethical debates then it is also necessary to go beyond the historical perspective, 
relevant as it may be. How can we otherwise address problems of the current debate? In 
recent years one of the most influential thinkers who engaged in the question of the reality of 
values is the American philosopher Thomas Nagel, who claims to have a realistic tendency 
when discussing the possibility of objective values.
 
ix
But Scheler’s philosophy of value ethics offers a response to the problem of values 
and the reality and objectivity of values that Nietzsche and the subsequent hermeneutics of 
suspicion brought into question. Scheler’s position that the value “universe” must always be a 
personal one addresses a problem that is not sufficiently discussed by either Moore or Nagel: 
that is, that value debates only make sense when discussed with reference to the person and 
his world. On these grounds we can develop the following position: certain ethical values can 
be simultaneously personal and objective, i.e. they can be affirmed from beyond the 
individual who holds that value (Nagel) but they can never exist outside the (inter)personal 
world .But Scheler allows us to take the value debate further. After all the question is not 
only if there are some objective values but furthermore, how can we develop a coherent and 
convincing system of preference that will allow us to choose one value over the other if 
necessary? Scheler’s answer to these questions is centred around an approach that describes 
how the structure of a “moral universe” coincides with the personal universe of values which 
in itself is centred around and structured by the value of the person. To develop this approach 
which we might call in short “Scheler’s personalism” is the aim of the second part of the 
paper. Rather than making a case for Scheler’s value theory it might be more interesting to 
ask where he fits into the overall discussions on values.  
 Although Nagel is critical of Moore and 
cannot be said to follow either Moore or Scheler (to whom there are no references in his 
work) his contribution to value theory is interesting as he touches upon the many rejections 
that have been raised against all kinds of value realism in recent debates. Nevertheless Nagel 
argues that (certain) values are indeed a) real, b) objective and c) knowable. Even though 
Nagel claims that parts of his approach are indeed “moral phenomenology” he does not refer 
to the thinkers normally connected with such an approach such as Scheler or Nicolai 
Hartmann.  
 
The Question of Objective Values 
 
The first point that would need to be clarified is the question of the realness and objectivity of 
values. Nagel states in his book The View from Nowhere that “(o)bjectivity is the central 
problem of ethics. Not just in theory but in practice”.x
The question of how objective values are possible (and this would include as an 
assumption that they are real also) is one that interests both Scheler and the analytic tradition. 
Objectivity is defined by Nagel as supra-personal, meaning that the value can be affirmed 
from a standpoint outside of the individual who holds that particular value. This does not 
mean that we necessarily need a proof that meets the requirements of scientific methodology 
to argue for the objectivity of values but one can rely on plausibility as being sufficient. If we 
look at the three positions of Moore, Nagel and Scheler we see general agreement that certain 
values can be considered to be objective and knowable on the grounds of the following 
points: 
  
a) truth claims can be made; 
b) even though values are felt by a particular person or individual the reason of why 
they are good (i.e. why pleasant is perceived to be good) cannot be founded only 
in an psychological account. In that case they would be incomplete, because, as 
Nagel notes, “normative explanations are an additional element or because they 
are [somehow] already present in certain types of psychological explanations”.xi
c) at least some values are cognitive in the wider sense, i.e. they can be known by 
intuition. 
 
For all three thinkers these facts point towards an at least partial ethical objectivism. Here, in 
order not to commit a natural fallacy, all agree that those values must not be founded in 
natural properties. Thus, the claims that the values are real say nothing about the reality of the 
object. Without going into too much detail at this point it is fair to say that both Moore and 
Nagel argue convincingly for why certain values can be seen to be recognizable in an 
objective way. The downside to both of their approaches seems to be that both of them can 
only come up with a very limited set of objective values. The only supra-personal or 
impersonal values that Nagel seems to accept straight away are pleasure and pain, while 
Moore expands them to friendship and beauty. This leads Nagel to the consequence that 
ethical judgements and reasoning cannot be solely based on impersonal values (which he 
calls “overobjectivication”) such as pleasure and pain.xii
 
 What is missing is, I believe a 
specific point of reference which corresponds to values. It is at this point that Scheler’s 
approach might provide a possible answer. His solution is grounded in a strict personalism. 
But what is meant by personalism and what does it solve? 
Scheler’s personalism 
 
For Scheler, any kind of ethical perspective is only possible from a personal perspective. The 
person, according to Scheler, is the concrete unity of acts, which founds all intentional acts.xiii 
This means that both the judgement of values and acting according to values can only stem 
from this personal unity of experience, which must not be understood as some kind of empty 
starting point of acts but rather their concrete being.xiv Moreover, to every person corresponds 
a world which is the world of the person, which is not identical with the “psychological ego” 
or “self”.xv
For Scheler just as for Moore, values are not rationally known. Scheler, following 
Blaise Pascal, refers to this type of knowing as logique du coeur – the logic of the heart. The 
logique du coeur describes the emotional acts of loving and hating as a means to recognize 
values and make them appear in the act of recognition. Values appear in an “in between”, i.e. 
between the loving/hating act of the person and the object. By performing the same 
intentional acts with the person, Scheler argues, we can gain an understanding of what values 
this person prefers since he acts according to them.
 Since the person  is and lives only in the performance of the acts he always 
escapes being grasped. In order to know anything about the person we must look at their acts 
and it is here that the question of ethics, values and the person coincide. 
 xvi This “acting with” gives us the ordo 
amoris, the crystal formula of the person. The argument can only work, if we assume that the 
values can be known which again relies on the fact that they have some kind of objective 
quality. If the latter would not be the case we could not recognize them at all.xvii
If some values have some kind of objective quality in them, then we can move to the 
next step and ask ourselves about the value preferences according to which each person 
chooses to act. The person is characterised by a specific value, the value of the person which 
 Just as we 
share as natural living beings a natural world, the different value worlds can be shared in 
mutual recognition.  
not only becomes real in the person but is also the carrier for all other values of virtue. 
Scheler’s value theory is constructed as a complex system that consists in each level being 
composed of an opposing set of value pairs (with the exception of the value of the person, 
which stands at the top and has no opposite) with a corresponding feeling, a form of social 
organization and an ideal role model. The “lowest” values, those of the pleasant and 
unpleasant are shared by all life forms but already with the next level of vital feelings we step 
into a value sphere that belongs to the personal and thus human value universe. Here we find 
the value modalities of the noble and the ignoble and sometimes also the modalities of the 
useful and the useless. With the third level we step into the sphere of spiritual values. 
Aesthetic (beauty and ugliness) and judicial values (right – wrong) can be found here. The 
final one is again a different level and here we find the values of the holy and the profane.xviii 
For Scheler, all these values have an objective quality to them. Scheler grounds his 
idea in a phenomenological approach in the wider sense: A particular value is experienced by 
different persons as valuable, e.g. the feeling of pleasure is always recognized as valuable 
and what is not pleasant as the opposite (Scheler calls those opposites “negative values”). 
Nagel has made a similar argument for the objectivity of specific values regardless of the 
specific contents in terms of the values of pleasure and pain. In addition Scheler argues that 
ethical preferences are a priori, meaning that the recognition of these values is not dependent 
on knowledge deduced from experience. Rather, having recognized the value intuitively, i.e. 
having “seen” it once, a starting point is created from the person who gains access to the 
whole value sphere. Therefore, from the starting point of the value of the person 
(Personenwert) all other values unfold in a structured hierarchical way, creating a “value 
universe”. It is important to note, that this “universe” neither belongs to the natural world nor 
is it in any way abstracted from it. In order to seek and see objectivity we need to refer to the 
appropriate sphere and subject which are the value cosmos and the person. Thus this concept 
would suit Nagel’s claim that, if we want to avoid Hume’s subjectivism, we need to find 
objectivity claims that fit the particular subject.xix
Nagel also analyses the major objections against objective value theories.The second 
of his objections, from a philosophical point of view, is the most interesting as it takes the 
position of presenting the unreality of values as an objective discovery. As Nagel states, the 
problem is not that “values seem to disappear but that there seem to be too many of them”.
  
xx 
If we push this argument in a slightly different direction that is not directly implied in Nagel’s 
position, we could argue for the fact that, because there are so many different ways and 
traditions of acquiring values, they cannot be real. This argument, however, appears to be 
based on a genetic fallacy, as the validity of a certain truth claim (e.g. this value is real) does 
not necessarily rely on the origin. This argument is ruled out by the distinction between 
genesis and validity. But there might be, if we look at Scheler’s approach, a different answer 
to that particular problem. For is it not true that the actual values are not that many? For 
although a countless number of objects might be considered to be pleasant, useful, beautiful 
etc. the value itself would be the pleasant, the useful, the beautiful rather than the multitude 
of objects being pleasures in themselves. In other words: The counterargument Nagel refers 
to confuses the value with a particular content, thus committing not only a genetic but also a 
naturalistic fallacy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is easy to see now where Scheler goes beyond the approaches of Moore and 
specifically Nagel. Moore’s approach does not allow for any kind of hierarchy while Nagel 
seems to accept only pain and pleasure as impersonal and thus objective values. There 
appears to be no basis in Nagel’s approach that would allow him to “ascend” into the other 
values spheres and at the same time claim that those values are objective values. Scheler’s 
approach on the other hand offers a solution to a particular problem: the question of how to 
maintain objectivity in normative judgements. Scheler argues that the value contents must be 
“goods” (Güter) in their own right and not reduced from any other facts or properties. Their 
reality is affirmed by their appearance which again relies on them being seen/felt/recognized 
by the person. This could be enough for value theory to remain part of the contemporary 
debate it might be reasonable to follow Nagel’s advice not to try to prove as such the 
possibility of realism but rather to refute the impossibility arguments.
xxiii
xxi As those felt values 
then inform normativity we encounter a normative realism found in values as motivational 
content which equals objectivity, i.e. we can make truth claims about them. Thus the 
argument made by Mackie that they are “not part of the fabric of the world”xxii is false. 
Scheler supports Moore’s argument for value properties and value qualities being non-natural 
properties. This does not necessarily mean to crowd the universe with extra quite mysterious 
entities,  but rather to expand what seems to be a very limited view of reality, and thus take 
the lived human experience as real experience seriously.  
 Scheler does not argue that a particular act is objectively good, but offers a sensible 
structure which can provide a guideline to how we approach values and ethics and to 
understanding how we structure our own value universe. As this structure emerges, the whole 
value system through which we see the world becomes constantly restructured with every 
new value that appears in it. This universe has the person as the centre and starting point and 
includes self and world in it. In other words: It is impossible to take the person out of the 
equation. Actions and decision making are then constantly adapted to reflect these changes. 
We can see a similarity to Nagel’s judgement that “(r)easons for actions have to be reasons 
for individuals, and individual perspectives can be expected to retain their moral importance 
so long as diverse human individuals exist”.xxiv
 
 But Scheler argues for more: Without the 
person we would have no starting point from which the value universe would unfold. 
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